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“The misnaming of fields of study is so common as to lead to what might be general 
systems laws. For example, Frank Harary once suggested the law that any field that 
had the word ‘science’ in its name was guaranteed thereby not to be a science. He 
would cite as examples Military Science, Library Science, Political Science, 
Homemaking Science, Social Science, and Computer Science” (Weinberg, 2001). To 
avoid misnaming of scientific fields making them explicit may help. In this paper, 
they are regarded as studies that generate or apply scientific knowledge, but are they 
the same or different from scientific research? This paper argues that: 
 
Premise 1: Scientific studies, research and scientific research are 
different processes that contain different interacting (knowledge) 
elements.  
 
We will argue later that the general types of scientific knowledge, called elements in 
this paper, are theories, scientific models and experiments. Although these elements 
may be regarded as components in General Systems Thinking (Weinberg, 2001), they 
are regarded as entities in our process model which captures the essential knowledge 
(as data) of the underlying scientific processes (e.g., hypothesis testing). In this sense, 
our process models may be considered as entity-relationship (ER) diagrams 
(Silberschatz et al., 2005) for physical realization and knowledge management use. 
Nevertheless, Premise 1 uses the term ‘elements’ rather than entities in ER diagrams 
for generality because such diagrams belongs to one type of conceptual tool in 
General Systems Thinking. 
 
Premise 1 is supported by construction, i.e., by building process models that define 
and differentiate scientific studies, research and scientific research. These process 
models put philosophical issues in their contexts rather than directly resolving these 
issues. The premise can also help us to distinguish scientific studies and other types of 
studies. However, for engineering studies that are closely related to scientific studies, 
it is necessary to differentiate them by their roles, where engineering is about solving 
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technical problems and science is about understanding (e.g., (Kosso, 2007)). Thus, we 
draw the following conclusion from premise 1: 
 
Conclusion 1: Scientific studies distinguish themselves from other 
types of studies by their processes, their elements and the roles of 
these elements. 
 
This conclusion suggests that prior philosophical investigations about science, which 
mainly focuses on either the scientific process or the knowledge elements of science, 
are not sufficient to distinguish scientific studies from other types of studies. This 
raises some questions about these prior philosophical investigations on science, i.e.: 
(a) Is science solely concerned with scientific research? 
(b) Does a scientific study have to have a hypothesis? 
(c) Do scientists carry out their investigation using a single scientific method? 
(d) Are paradigms (Kuhn, 1962) and the scientific method of the Vienna circle 
applicable only to science? 
Furthermore, these process models, themselves, pose more-basic questions about 
recent philosophical investigations on science: 
(e) Are theories and models approximately true (e.g., Weston, 1987)? 
(f) Are all theories incommensurable (Kuhn, 1962)? 
(g) Are all computational models complex versions of scientific models? 
(h) How does a subject develop into a scientific study? 
 
We argue that philosophy of science should neither just focus on the research 
processes that are investigated in the conventional philosophy of science (e.g., Kuhn’s 
paradigm and the Scientific Method of the Vienna Circle), nor just focus on the study 
of scientific knowledge. To support this argument, we realized that simply relying on 
the research process or the knowledge organization alone cannot differentiate 
scientific studies from other studies. For examples about research processes, Kuhn’s 
idea about paradigm shift is applicable to the history of the philosophy of science. The 
scientific method is applicable to criminal investigation. Gauch’s (2003) PEL model 
of scientific reasoning is applicable to law. For other examples about knowledge 
organization, not only scientific knowledge is organized as theories with principles, 
law also has its own legal theories and principles. In engineering, there is an 
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abundance of performance models. Philosophers have been using logic as a way to 
organize their knowledge and making inferences. Some argued that science is about 
understanding, but studies, by definition, seek to understand. Simply using the aim of 
scientific studies is not sufficient to differentiate between scientific ones and studies 
in other disciplines.  
 
We argue that scientific studies are distinguished by the combination of their 
processes, their way of organizing scientific knowledge and the roles that different 
types of scientific knowledge serve. To support this argument, we develop process 
models, more specifically data flow diagrams, in order to model scientific studies, 
research and scientific research as separate processes. Because each process has 
different knowledge elements, these processes are different. These different elements 
are different types of knowledge, and each element has its own role in the process 
model. The role of an element helps to distinguish itself from others, as well as 
scientific processes and other processes. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our process model 
of scientific study. Physics is used as an archetype (rather than as a universal science 
(Białkowski, 1998)) to illustrate the application of this process model. Section 3 
develops the process model for research, and combines this model with the one for 
scientific studies to form the process model for scientific research. Section 4 applies 
the process models to explain scientific progress, whereas Section 5 applies these 
models to chart a possible development of scientific study. Section 6 is about related 
work. Finally, Section 7 draws our conclusion about what is science. 
2. Process model 
We argue that: 
 
Definition 1: A scientific study has three (knowledge) elements: 
theory, model and experiment.  
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Figure 1: A process model of scientific study. 
 
This is supported by providing evidence that these three (knowledge) elements are 
important to science. For example, large sums of funding are used to build particle 
accelerators in order to conduct experiments for particle physics research. Also, the 
scientific model of nuclear fission behind nuclear power station is important to predict 
the amount of energy released from certain amount of enriched uranium. The 
scientific model of nuclear fission uses the famous equation, E = mc
2
, to calculate the 
amount of energy released during fission. This equation is derived from the theory of 
special relativity. Experiments (Franklin, 1981), scientific models (e.g., Swanson, 
1967) and theories (e.g., Alexander, 1958) have also been extensively discussed in 
philosophy of science. Therefore, they are important in both science and the 
philosophy of science, but they are not integrated as elements in a process model as 
described in this paper. 
 
Our process model of scientific study is shown in Figure 1. It has entities (as 
rectangles) and processes (as directed lines). It has four entities: the theory entity, the 
model entity, the experiment entity and the physical situation entity. An entity is an 
extension of a set of instances, and one instance of an entity is called an entity 
instance (Silberschatz et al., 2005). For example, the theory entity can denote a single 
theory or a set of theories. The connections between theories (in the form of a 
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hierarchy, for example) are hidden in the process model at this stage. Similar to 
entities, a process can denote a single process instance or a set of process instances. 
The physical situation entity is an external entity that is being studied and is not a part 
of the scientific study. This is the only entity that is not a knowledge element in 
Figure 1. Table 1 shows some details about theories, models and experiments. 
 
Table 1: A summary of various aspects of elements of science 
Aspect Theory (Scientific) Model Experiment 
Aim Generalize the scientific 
models into a set of 
general/universal 
statements 
Describe physical situations 
as accurately as possible 
Collect information from 
physical situations 
 Find essential aspects of 
the subject 
  
Usage Construct models for 
novel situations 
Make predictions of future 
events 
Evaluate models 
 Explain observed 
phenomena 
Test theories Test theories 
   Explore characteristics of 
the subject 
Scope Define the scope of the 
investigation 
Define a set of applicable 
physical situations that the 
model can describe 
Define a type of physical 




Qualitative with named 
quantities and/or 
quantiative 
Qualitative and quantitative Usually quantitative 
Measure of 
Quality 




Use conceptual tools, 
like logic, to make 
general or universal 
statements 
Use mathematics or logic as 
tools to construct models 
Use experimental design 
techniques or statistical 
methods 
 
Details about the entities at this stage are deliberately hidden. The purpose is to 
simplify the study so that we can identify what are the major elements of science and 
how they interact. Scientists are not included in the model in Figure 1, because of 
limited space, even though we recognize that scientists themselves are important 
elements in the process of science. At this general level, it is customary not to model 
the operators (i.e., scientists) in the process models. According to Figure 1, theories 
and models can only get in touch with physical situations via experiments. Since an 
entity and a process are sets, a theory entity instance that generalizes a set of scientific 
model entity instances is represented only as a single process from theory to scientific 
model in Figure 1. The concern of this process model at this general level is about the 
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existence of the process (including its direction) between entities, leaving out its 
details (e.g., one-to-one mapping, one-to-many mapping or many-to-many mapping). 
Table 1 shows different aspects of different elements of scientific studies. The aims of 
each element are specified in Table 1. These aims define the different roles that these 
elements play. They help scientific studies to differentiate themselves from other 
types of studies. The measures of quality of each element are different because the 
aims of each element are different. The scope of an element specifies the regime in 
which the element is applicable. The remaining aspects provide further differences 
between different elements of scientific studies. 
2.1. Instance Diagram 
For more details in Figure 1, we can draw an instance diagram (Silberschatz et al., 
2005) that is a realization of the process model in Figure 1. For example, Galileo 
carried out two well-known experiments that are called the Tower of Pisa experiment, 
and the bell and ball experiment. These two experiments refute Aristotle’s theory that 
the heavier object falls faster than a lighter object. Figure 2 shows a realization of the 
process model of Figure 1 in this case. Figure 2 does not have any scientific models 
because the experiments did not need complex calculations. These experiments only 
need to measure the duration for the heavier and lighter objects to reach the floor, in 
order to refute Aristotle’s theory. 
 
 
Figure 2: An instance diagram of Galileo’s experiments. 
 
For a more elaborate example than Galileo’s experiments, we chose Newtonian 
mechanics, because it is well known and it is an archetype of a mature scientific study 
that lasted for over two centuries until it was shown to be a special case of the theory 
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of general relativity. In Newtonian mechanics, many experiments involve complex 
quantitative relationships that are derived or constructed from the principles (or laws) 
of the theory. For example, in Figure 3(a), a trolley is sliding down a slope with a 
constant degree θ of inclination. Unlike the bell and ball experiment conducted by 
Galileo, we are not simply interested in whether trolleys of different weights traveling 
from the top to the bottom of the slope arrive at the same time. Instead, we are 
interested in the quantitative relationship between θ and the time that the trolley 
travels from the top to the bottom of the slope. If there is no friction, then 
( ) )1(,sin
2
1 2tgd ××= θ  
where d is the distance that the trolley travels in time t, and g is the acceleration due to 
earth’s gravity. This equation is obtained by constructing a model as shown in Figure 
3(a) using not only Newton’s three laws of motion but also Newton’s universal law of 
gravitation. The same laws can be applied to the projectile experiment shown in 
Figure 3(b). In this case, a canon fires a ball with θ degree of inclination. If the canon 








where dh is the horizontal distance that the canon ball travelled. 
 
 
Figure 3: Four models of physical situations where F1 is the gravitation force due to 
the mass of the object. We call these models with the following names: (a) rolling 
model, (b) projectile model, (c) centripetal model and (d) vibration model. 
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Figure 3(c) shows a model of a toy plane revolving around a pivot with constant 
speed v at θ degree of declination. The tension on the string connecting the plane and 
the pivot is F2 that both lifts the plane and provides the centripetal force for the plane. 
If the string is d meters long, then using Newton’s laws and the mathematics of 
rotating reference frame, the quantitative relationship will be: 
)3(.coscot dgv ×××= θθ  
This example shows that the law is applied in combination with other mathematical 
techniques in order to produce some quantitative relationship that can be verified or 
applied in practice. 
 
Figure 3(d) shows a model of the vibration experiment that involves a mass and a 
spring. When the mass is displaced by a certain vertical distance from its equilibrium 
position then the mass under free vibration oscillates at a frequency f. Apart from the 
laws in Newtonian mechanics, we need an empirical relationship, called Hooke’s law, 
to specify the amount of force, S, that is exerted by a deformed spring with a distance. 
According to Hooke’s law which only applies to certain material in certain 
configuration, S = − k dv, where k is called the spring constant, and dv is the amount of 
deformation of the spring. Using Newtonian mechanics with Hooke’s law, a 
quantitative relationship is found for a freely vibrating rigid object attached of mass m 









This special case illustrates that Newtonian mechanics does not contain all laws 
involved in the construction of a model. Instead, it contains laws that are commonly 
found or those that are applied to a wide variety of situations. On the other hand, 
Hooke’s law is applicable to a certain type of spring. More complex vibration systems 
can be analyzed using Hooke’s law together with Newtonian mechanics. Together, 
these laws form a focused theory that explains and quantifies vibration systems of 
rigid bodies suspended by linear-elastic material. 
 
Figure 4 is an instance diagram showing the application of Newtonian mechanics to 
construct the four models in Figure 3. It also shows how Newtonian mechanics are 
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subsumed by the theory of general relativity. Laws in Newtonian mechanics are 
applied in all four models. Some suggested that these are universal laws that are 
applicable to all situations. Later, the confirmation of the theory of special relativity 
restricted Newtonian mechanics to the regime where the speed of objects is much less 
than the speed of light. Scientists seek to establish laws or principles that are 
applicable to many different situations within the regime of study. Contrasting with 
Hooke’s law, its application is much more restricted than those for Newtonian 
mechanics. As a result, there is a distinction between focused theories that explain 
certain phenomena (like simple harmonic motion) and the general theories that are 
applied to build models for a wide variety of situations.  
 
 
Figure 4: An instance diagram describing the application of Newtonian mechanics 
(under the theory of general relativity) to the four situations in Figure 3. 
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Figure 4 also shows that some theories do not have any model as part of the theory. 
Instead, models are built when the situation arises. Earlier, each model in Figure 3 has 
a quantitative relationship (i.e., equations 1-4) that is derived from the theory so that 
this relationship can be quantified and verified in practice. However, not all models 
are quantitative. For instance, Galileo’s experiments about free-fall objects refute 
Aristotle’s theory by observing whether objects of different weights reach the floor at 
the same time when these objects fall under the same conditions. 
 
In Figure 4, the experiment entity instances and the (scientific) model entity instances 
can be distinguished by information related only to those entity instances alone, where 
such information is not shown in the diagram for clarity of presentation. For example, 
some field experiments may have been carried out under specific conditions which are 
recorded as part of these experiments and not part of the scientific models. Controlled 
experiments may specify what instruments are used for making measurements which 
are not documented with the scientific models. The detailed derivations of the 
quantitative relationships are documented with the (scientific) model instances rather 
than the experiment entity instances. In addition, a (scientific) model entity instance 
may be used by different experiment entity instances to measure different quantities 
(e.g. angle θ or distance travelled) in its quantitative relationship. 
 
2.2. Scientific Study Elements 
In this section, we relate philosophical issues with our description of the elements in 
scientific studies. Our description of these elements does not resolve these issues, but 
put them into the context of scientific study rather than scientific research. 
 
What is a theory? There are at least two different types of scientific theories: general 
and focused theories. A general theory aims to generalize (e.g., Nugavey, 1985; 
Bailer-Jones, 2003) both models and more focused theories in order to provide a 
parsimonious description of them. For example, the general theory of 
electromagnetism as summarized by Maxwell’s equations combines the laws of 
Faraday, Ampère and others. So, a theory consists of some general/universal 
statements (Nowak, 1972; Moor, 1978; Bailer-Jones, 2003; Liu, 2004) of the subject 
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of interest (or within some regime). These statements can be ascribed with truth 
values so that they can be tested empirically (as opposed to those that are not 
falsifiable, e.g., (Magnani, 1999)). It also has its own concepts (e.g., momentum) that 
are measurable or related to physical situation. A theory must have a statement about 
the scientific discourse to define its scope. It may have some presupposition (Gauch, 
2003) that the theory assumes. Also, it may have principles (Suppes, 1995) that 
models or experiments are intended to obey. In the general case, these general 
statements can be grouped into different types, such as principles, presuppositions, 
conditions, and assumptions. 
 
Statements in a theory are intended to be true (Psillos, 2000). Some statements are not 
always true but they are stated in the theory in order to simplify the situation for 
modeling or explaining a physical situation, thereby leaving out the details that are not 
the focus of the inquiry (Nowak, 1972; Liu, 1998; Bailer-Jones, 2003). In addition, 
this treatment of statements is useful to deduce new results for prediction, verification, 
validation, falsification and model construction (Portides, 2005). This is also useful to 
differentiate the qualifying measure of scientific knowledge as being true or false that 
is applied to statements of a theory, as opposed to being accurate or not, which is 
applied to scientific models. Statements that are intended to be true may be regarded 
as belief (Psillos, 2000), but scientists may not necessarily believe in the statements of 
a theory when they are testing the theory. We can summarize the notion of truth in 
scientific knowledge as follows: 
 
Definition 2: When a statement in a scientific theory is said to be 
true, this means that the theory asserts that the objects or relations 
specified in the statement are manifested and are operating within 
the regime of study. 
 
A theory may have general qualitative models, because they can account for a finite 
number of types of situations to describe. Alternatively, a theory may not have any 
qualitative models, because there are an unknown number of possible situations to 
describe. In general, it is also possible that a theory contains a number of theories with 
more limited scope than the original theory. 
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There are different kinds of theories. A mathematical theory is quantitative, and it 
focuses on solving some mathematical problems. Some mathematical theories may 
have been successfully applied across various disciplines (e.g., von Bertalanffy, 1950), 
and many mathematical theories have been axiomized. While theory axiomization 
(Liu, 1998) can distinguish the elementary concepts from the derived concepts, it 
should be pointed out that a mathematical theory can be axiomized differently (i.e., 
there can be more than one set of axioms for a theory). A logical theory is a 
qualitative theory based on logic. The focus of such a theory is on valid reasoning or 
inferences based on its premises; PEL (Gauch, 2003) is a good example. 
 
A scientific theory is a theory that has both qualitative and quantitative aspects, as 
well as empirical significance. So, it is not unusual to find named quantities in 
statements of a scientific theory. In some scientific theories, they have a set of general 
equations (e.g., Maxwell’s equations) that can be used to develop scientific models. 
While scientific theories are quantified mathematically, many scientific theories are 
not axiomized, because of the fact that the axioms are more about the mathematical 
properties rather than the scientific properties (i.e., the principles or laws) of the 
subject of study. An established scientific theory must be self-consistent, so this 
would demand good reasoning (Gauch, 2003). Otherwise, the theory needs to be 
revised and replaced. The theory needs to be quantified because it involves some 
measurements for validations and predictions. An established scientific theory must 
relate to some physical events or their derivatives, so that it has empirical significance. 
Some theories are based on more fundamental, and therefore more general theories. 
For example, the theory of sound propagation in a solid can be built on Newtonian 
mechanics. Usually the fundamental or general theories have a wider scope of 
application than the more focused theories that explain certain physical phenomena.  
 
What is a scientific model? A model is a description of a type of physical situations, 
so it is an abstract or conceptual situation (Portides, 2005) that is constructed (Hennig, 
2010) as an approximate version of the corresponding physical situation being 
studied. On the one hand, a model aims to describe or predict the physical situation as 
accurately as possible. So, a scientific model is usually quantitative, and it borrows 
mathematics (Suppes, 1960) for the purpose of quantification (Davy, 2003). On the 
other hand, a model simplifies a physical situation by ignoring details that are thought 
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to be insignificant or unrelated to the inquiry. So, a model typically has some 
simplifying assumptions that are made (Achinstein, 1965), not because they are true 
(Nowak, 1972; Morton, 1993) but because they are convenient for modeling and for 
the scientific study. This kind of simplification provides a handle to the underlying 
knowledge of the subject. Rarely, scientific models are more complex than necessary. 
Such instances can occur when scientists borrow sophisticated mathematical models 
handling as many factors as possible so that their models or some techniques can 
discover the critical factors for predictions. Therefore, a scientific model sometimes 
can be a simplification of or an over-complication (in certain respect) of the physical 
situation. However, such a model is always intended to be a good approximation of 
the physical situation. 
 
It is not necessary that the description of an abstract situation has to be isomorphic or 
similar (Suárez, 2003) to the corresponding physical situation. For example, the 
descriptions may be simply describing just the input and output of a physical situation, 
as well as their relationships, or the descriptions may be an elaborate one that entails 
the detail and possibly hidden mechanics of the situation.  
 
In mathematical terms, representation (more specifically, representation theorem) is 
an isomorphism or a bijective map. A bijection has two properties: injection (i.e., one-
to-one mapping) and surjection (i.e., onto mapping). Because a model leaves out 
details of the physical situation, some objects or details in the physical situation are 
not in the model. In this case, the mapping from the objects of the model to objects in 
the physical situation will not be surjective, and therefore not bijective. Even if we 
limit the physical objects that matter to the study, we cannot be sure whether the 
mapping is surjective, because we do not know whether there are any hidden variables 
or latent variables (Bartholomew and Knott, 1999) even though there are statistical 
techniques (e.g., principal element analysis) to handle such variables. 
 
Injective map is desirable because we can refer to objects in the physical situation 
unambiguously. However, we are also not certain whether the mapping between 
objects in the model and those in the physical situation is injective. This is because the 
intended objects that are recognized as one type of objects in the physical situation 
may turn out to be two different types of objects. Therefore, models are only intended 
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to map to objects on a one-to-one basis (i.e., injective) or in a stronger sense represent 
the physical situation (i.e., a bijection). While science may appear to rest on shaky 
foundations, we need to recall that a model does not survive on the basis that they 
have a one-to-one mapping to the physical situation. Instead, it survives because it is 
able to predict the outcomes accurately and reliably, able to predict more types of 
physical situations and be consistent with (existing) theories. In order to increase both 
accuracy and reliability of predictions, some scientists even investigate how these are 
done using more variety of data (e.g., Kruse, 1997). Given that the mapping between 
objects of the model and objects in the physical situation is usually intended to be 
injective (or more strongly bijective), we prefer to say that models are approximate 
versions of the corresponding physical situations. We summarize the previous 
discussion about the role of scientific models, which is related to the philosophical 
debate on realism: 
 
Definition 3: A scientific model is said to be realistic when it can 
predict quantities accurately and reliably in uncontrolled 
experiments within the regime of study. 
 
The level of accuracy and reliability makes reference to the current achieved level. As 
the lowest baseline of comparison, this level of accuracy and reliability should be 
better than the level predicted by a naive random model that forms the null hypothesis 
for statistical tests of reliability. Such a random model has little domain-specific 
knowledge, so it cannot claim to exhibit any understanding of the subject of study. 
 
The development of scientific models involves ignoring details of the physical 
situation or making assumptions for simplification. The justification of ignoring 
certain details or including what are considered important factors may be based on 
intuition, common sense (Miscevic, 2001), philosophical issues (Bailer-Jones, 2003) 
past research issues or some creative process (Beveridge, 1957; Bailer-Jones, 1999). 
For instance, formative research where little is known for certain about the particular 
field of investigation may rely more on common sense to identify governing factors of 
a model. Experiments can be designed to test which of these factors are important in 
the subject of study. For some established area of science, existing theories, models, 
experiments and research issues can guide the selection or addition of details in the 
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model. Thought experiments may be particularly suitable in this kind of knowledge-
rich domain (Damper, 2006). In the case of the application of an existing theory to 
develop new models for novel physical situations, the physical situation may provide 
guidance to include additional details for accurate modeling (Bailer-Jones, 2003). 
 
What is an experiment? An experiment is carried out in a physical situation.  The aim 
of doing an experiment is to collect information from the physical situation for 
various purposes. The information can be used to support or deny a theory or its 
elements. It may be used to evaluate a model. It may be used to find characteristics of 
the phenomena for building models or theories. In order to obtain information from 
physical situations, the experiment must do some measurement. An experiment may 
directly excite the physical situation because it can control the excitation, or it may 
make measurements using a natural excitation source (e.g., observation of stars). The 
quality of an experiment depends on many factors (Franklin, 1981), and probability 
and statistics are increasingly used to assess the reliability and repeatability of the 
experimental outcomes (Suppes, 2007). 
 
There are different types of experiments. Controlled experiments are usually used to 
validate theoretical statements. The experiments are controlled so that the impact of 
the intervening or interfering factors is reduced as much as possible. In some cases, 
the controlled experiment becomes so simple (or so focused) that it is not necessary to 
declare a scientific model is used to quantify the controlled experiment and predict its 
outcomes. Instead, scientists directly show how the interested quantities are calculated 
in order to show the manifestation of some theoretical statements (e.g., Rainville et al., 
2005), and the unnamed scientific model is literally hidden from communication. 
Natural experiments belong to another type of experiments. The focus of such 
experiments is to collect data in a practical situation rather than in controlled 
environment. Such experiments may determine the inadequacy of scientific models or 
theories in practical situations. 
 
What is a physical situation? It is a state of affairs in which an experiment is carried 
out. It is physical because the scientists designed the experiment to observe the “real 
world” in a particular intended context. In other words, a physical situation is some 
part of the real world that is the subject of study. 
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What is the real world? The real world refers to the totality of physical situations that 
we, as a whole, experience in the past, in the present, as well as in the future. 
Different people have different real worlds in mind because we are exposed to a 
limited scope of the real world. Many scientists only deal with the limited physical 
situations related to their subject of study (or a regime). Some scientists believe that 
the real world is the same all the time and everywhere, because they believe that this 
makes the real world objectively accessible and universally applicable. Some 
scientists do not want to make a leap of faith to generalize their own daily and 
scientific experience to the real world as a whole. However, all scientists would agree 
that they intended their experiments to be conducted in objectively accessible physical 
situations (and not necessarily the real world as a whole) so that their scientific work 
can be communicated to others for verification and agreement (Hennig, 2010). This 
objective accessibility includes subjective descriptions of mental phenomena (Nagel, 
1974) since these descriptions may fall into certain categories or types when they are 
collected from many (human) subjects and since descriptions are objectively 
accessible. 
2.3. Process 
Having described the different entities, our discussion focuses on the processes. One 
of the processes is the construction of scientific models based on theories (Bod, 2006; 
Morrison, 2006). A scientific model should be consistent with the theory. The 
applications of the theory to build the model should be based on valid reasoning to 
ensure or demonstrate consistency between the application of the theory and the 
scientific model. Since a theory is a discourse, selective statements, like principles 
and assumptions, which can be ascribed with truth values, can be used for scientific 
model construction. It is also not necessary that the entire theory be applied to build a 
scientific model. For instance, the vibration model in Section 2.1 does not use all 
three Newton’s laws of motion. 
 
In the other direction, the revision process may modify a theory when its model is 
being modified for better predictions. The revision process also generalizes successful 
scientific models into a theory so that the essential aspects of these models are 
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identified in the theory. These essential aspects may be the principles or assumptions 
of the theory, which are independent of the models and are applicable to different 
abstract and physical situations. For example, the principle of conservation of energy 
is applicable to quantum mechanics as well as to Newtonian mechanics. 
 
The processes between the scientific model and the experiment are the prediction and 
evaluation of models. A model makes predictions of physical situations that it intends 
to be applied to. A prediction is commonly understood to be a quantity but the 
prediction can also be a dichotomous value. Evaluation involves collecting data where 
the experiments are repeated a number of times for reliability assessment. The 
collected data are processed to inform scientists on how accurate the model makes 
prediction. Statistical tests can be carried out to give scientists some measure of 
reliability of the outcomes, e.g., confidence levels.  In view of the results in 
experiments, a model may undergo revisions and possibly the theory also needs to be 
revised.  
 
The processes between theory and experiment are concerned with collecting data 
from experiments to feedback information to the scientists for the support, denial, 
revision or construction of the theory. What kind of data to collect depends on the 
need of the scientist. For instance, when there is no established theory in the current 
study, a scientist may collect statistical summary data in order to begin building a 
theory. On another occasion, a scientist may want to test a certain part of an 
established theory; a hypothesis about the theory can be formulated and tested by 
experiments. This is the common notion of scientific method of the Vienna Circle, 
which is originated from the inferences as observed by Pierce (1989) in science. This 
inference includes abduction, deduction and induction. Abduction is to guess 
plausible causes or explanations of the observed effect. To test which causes or 
explanations, alternative outcomes serving as hypotheses are deduced from such 
causes or explanations. Experiments are carried out to inductively infer which cause is 
responsible for the observed effect. Such inference is being adopted in the emerging 
cyberinfrastructure for geosciences (e.g., (Brodaric and Gahegan, 2006)). 
 
Some historical scientists have been critical of the scientific method using induction 
as the only acceptable method of scientific inquiry (e.g., (Cleland, 2001)) because 
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their experiments may not be able to be repeated in laboratory or may not be able to 
be found in the field.  Examples of historical scientific inquiries include the meteorite-
impact hypothesis for the extinction of the dinosaurs and big-bang theory of the origin 
of the universe. Instead of repeating the experiments, scientists find pieces of 
evidence from different sources or of different character, which are documented in the 
experiment entity instances (called cases), to support the hypothesis or theory, and to 
eliminate the alternative hypothesis or theories. Sometimes, scientific models are 
needed to determine certain quantities that can be observed now (e.g., the background 
radiation due to the primordial explosion according to the big-bang theory). Such 
quantity provides a piece of evidence to support a particular hypothesis or theory. For 
historical science the method of inquiry is very similar to criminal investigation, and 
their differences are the aim of the investigation and their knowledge elements. 
Computational Models 
As computational models are becoming increasingly significant (e.g., weather 
forecasting), we are motivated to include some computational models (Moor, 1978) as 
scientific models. The digital computer, which is a computing device based on logic 
and mathematics, is essentially executing a detailed version of some scientific models. 
The problem with perceiving a computational model as a scientific model is the 
complexity of a computational model. Many scientific models can be comprehended 
by human but the complexity of a computational model may be very difficult to 
understand. In addition, a computational model incorporates many details that are 
considered not essential in a scientific model. This raises concern whether the 
prediction problems are due to deficiencies in the basic scientific models, or due to 
inappropriate, or irrelevant, or the lack of details in the computational model. We 
believe that computational models which defy human understanding cannot qualify as 
a scientific model. 
 
We refer to computational models that are shown to correspond to scientific models 
after simplifications as computational scientific models. Such models are regarded by 
us as a type of scientific models. The other scientific models are called conventional 
scientific models. Figure 5 shows a detailed diagram where the scientific model in 
Figure 1 is divided into conventional and computational scientific models. 
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The purpose of developing computational scientific models is to produce simulated 
experimental results (Boon, 2003) in order for the scientists to understand what are 
the outcomes and their likelihood, as well as for appreciating the significance and 
impact of these outcomes. The need of such appreciation and understanding is 
because of the difficulties to carry out the experiment. Such difficulties may stem 
from the scale of the experiment, the controllability of the experiment or the fatality 
of the experimental outcomes. 
 
 
Figure 5: A process model of scientific study that includes computational models. 
 
Some computational models cannot be called computational scientific ones because 
they drastically simplify the physical situation for controlled studies so that they can 
be used for testing theories or hypotheses. These computational models are called 
simulation models which may be used in the experiment. For example, the ELIZA 
program (Weizenbaum, 1966) held conversations with human subjects in the 
experiment, and some subjects considered that the program responses were by human 
subjects. In this case, the ELIZA program was denied by Weizenbaum as a theory of 
conversation because the program only relies on superficial syntactic and semantic 
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cues to respond. In addition, human subjects have access only to the ELIZA program 
textual output. In such a controlled environment, this experiment using a simulation 
model may be considered as testing the hypothesis that syntactic and semantic cues 
are sufficient for holding conversations rather than testing the ELIZA program as a 
computational scientific model of human conversation. 
 
Simulation models belong to the experiment entity as such models are experimental 
tools for investigation (Humphreys, 1995; Hartmann, 1996). However, the simulation 
model entity is placed side-by-side with the computational scientific model entity in 
Figure 5 in order to show that they are both computational models, and that 
simulation models may become computational scientific ones when they are fully 
developed for realistic simulation in more uncontrolled environments. Furthermore, 
simulation models may be evaluated on how realistic they are, and computational 
scientific models may be used to generate responds in the experiment. 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the flexibility of the process model because each entity or 
relationship can potentially be developed into more detailed process models 
themselves. Effectively, the complexity of the process can be hidden or emerged 
depending on the required level of details of the process. In the rest of this paper, we 
will discuss the scientific model for generality, rather than its three detailed entities, 
conventional scientific models, computational scientific ones and simulation models. 
3. Scientific research 
Some consider that scientific studies and research are synonymous, and empirical 
results in research papers are demanded. However, some significant research papers 
do not have any direct empirical support. For example, the paper by Einstein (1905) 
on the theory of special relativity does not have any first-hand empirical results to 
support the theory. Important research papers that survey particular fields of inquiry 
also do not have any first-hand empirical results. In this section, we use our 
understanding of scientific study to relate and differentiate between scientific studies 
and other related areas. 
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We believe that research, instead of scientific studies, is a problem-solving activity (or 
more generally a question-answering activity), even though there are many ways in 
which interest in research begins (Struan, 2001; Koshland, 2007). Research aims to 
discover new ideas for solving problems. It can be framed as a scientific study 
(Lauden, 1987) because it can involve building new theories or scientific models, 
conducting new experiments, making new extension of a theory or a model, making 
new observations of existing experiments, etc. However, some research cannot be 
considered as scientific study. For example, there is research done in literature in 
order to discover a new perspective or understanding of some classical literature. At 
the other end of the spectrum, not all scientific processes are research. For example, 
scientific processes may be used for forensic studies in criminal investigation, or for 
monitoring the amount of toxic chemicals in food for public health and safety. 
Instruments used for scientific studies are also used in these scientific processes but 
they do not serve to find better models or theories as in research. Similar to scientific 
research, trained scientists and laboratory technicians are employed to carry out these 
experiments or tests in government laboratories. However, these confirmation studies 
are carried out for monitoring purposes and they are not carried out as scientific 
research for the better understanding and modeling of toxic chemicals. While research 
and scientific studies have a significant overlap, they are not synonymous. 
 
To substantiate that research and scientific studies are not synonymous, we developed 
a process model of research (Figure 6). Our process model of research is similar to 
our process model of scientific study (Figure 1). The experiment and physical 
situation entities of research are the same as the experiment and physical situation 
entities in Figure 1. The solution entity in Figure 6 corresponds to the model entity in 
Figure 1.  This is because sometimes the solutions involve mathematical models for 
solving a research problem. Also, a solution solves a particular problem in a particular 
situation, which is similar to a model that describes a specific situation. The problem 
entity in Figure 6 corresponds to the theory entity in Figure 1. This is because a 
problem can be considered as a kind of generalization of the different solutions for the 
same problem, similar to a theory being a generalization of a number of scientific 
models. 
 
Luk, R.W.P. (2010) Understanding scientific study via process modeling. Foundations of Science 15(1): 49-78 
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10699-009-9168-9 
  
23
Unlike scientific theories, a research problem does not necessarily need to have any 
empirical significance. For example, some research in mathematics aims to discover a 
solution for a well known mathematical problem (i.e., a conjecture). A mathematical 
proof is needed. This means that some research does not necessarily have empirical 
significance. For instance, survey-type research papers synthesize past research works 
into a coherent account of current frontiers of knowledge and current issues of the 
particular chosen research topic. Such reviews (e.g., papers in ACM computing 
survey) seldom report any first-hand experiments about the physical world. 
 
 
Figure 6: A process model of research. 
 
Similar to scientific theories, a research problem also has a number of general 
statements that describe the nature of the problem being solved. Therefore, statements 
that define the scope of the problem are similar to the statements that define the scope 
of a scientific theory. However, many types of statements of a research problem are 
not related to statements in a scientific theory. For example, the constraints and 
objective functions of a research problem are not necessary parts of a scientific theory. 
 
The focus of many engineering research works is to find better solutions to a technical 
problem (Boon, 2006). These solutions may involve some mathematical techniques or 
experimental know-how. However, sometimes, these solutions are models of physical 
situations. The parameters of these models are then optimized in order to solve the 
problem both effectively and efficiently. As a result, these models are called 
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normative models that prescribe the best action to take in the given situation. These 
models are different from the descriptive models of science, which aims to describe 
the situation accurately. Some solutions solve very specific problems, and others can 
solve a variety of problems. Therefore, different names of solutions are created 
depending on how general a problem that they can solve. The most specific solution is 
called a technique, followed by algorithms, methods, approaches, and methodologies. 
 
Similar to the common notion of scientific study (i.e., the “scientific method” 
advocated by the Vienna Circle), research always starts with a research problem 
(more generally, the research question) (Sintonen, 2004) that is not trivial to solve 
(more generally, the answer). The research problem or question is similar to the 
hypothesis in the scientific method (Sintonen, 2004). Unlike the scientific method that 
demands a hypothesis to be related to some theory or some statement in a theory that 
explains observed phenomena, the research problem or question does not need to be 
related to any theory, nor related to any observed phenomena. For examples, scientists 
(Rainville et al., 2005) can develop new instruments to make observations that is 
much more precise than before or that cannot be observed before. Researchers can 
carry out experiments to collect data about the size and the nature of the research 
problem (and not the solution). 
 
 
Figure 7: An instance diagram of an example research process. Note that the physical 
situation instances are not drawn here for presentation clarity. 
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Figure 7 shows an instance diagram of an illustrative, example research process, and 
details about the physical situation instances are not drawn for clarity. In this example, 
the original research problem is divided into two specific problems (i.e., A1 and A2). 
Preliminary experiments (i.e., 1 and 2) are carried out. It is found that problem A1 is 
not significant, so a simplifying assumption is made to ignore problem A1. Problem 
A2 is significant, and solution 1 tries to solve this problem. Experiment 3 evaluates 
whether solution 1 produces good results. By analyzing the results, it is found that 
solution 1 has problem A3. Therefore, solution 2 is designed to solve problem A3. 




Figure 8: A unified process model of scientific research that combines the notion of 
scientific studies, applied science and research. 
 
Figure 8 shows a unified process model that combines the process model for scientific 
study and the one for research. The unified process model added three processes that 
apply either the theory entity or the scientific model entity to the solution entity. 
These two processes are added in order to account for applied science (Boon, 2006; 
Morrison, 2006) that applies known scientific models and theories to solve practical, 
technical research problems. As Boon (2006) examined the case of fluid flows, known 
scientific models and theories in hydrodynamics may not be adequate to predict 
accurately quantities in the field or practical situations (rather than controlled 
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experiments in scientific studies) that the technical problem originates. Such model 
and theories need to integrate technical knowledge in hydraulics to develop more 
realistic models for solving technical problems in practical situations. 
 
In Figure 8, three processes, with the label “has”, are added in the unified process 
model in order to relate the theory and scientific model entities with the problem 
entity. These three processes describe the case when the theory, scientific model and 
experiment entities have unresolved problems. For example, classical theory could not 
explain the black-body radiation spectrum. Such unexplained observation may 
become research problems. Scientists may develop a completely new theory (i.e., the 
quantum theory of Max Planck) or extend existing theory to explain the phenomena. 
These two processes with the label “has” suggest the cause of the confusion that 
scientific studies and research are synonymous. This is because the theory and 
scientific model sometimes can be embedded as some parts of research. However, 
there are many types of research that do not need a scientific model or a theory, for 
example, philosophical investigations.  
 
Figure 8 distinguishes between basic scientific research (or pure scientific research as 
in Hansson, 2007) and applied scientific research. For basic scientific research, the 
targeted research problem is related to the theories, scientific models or experiments. 
This corresponds to three directed lines that are labeled “has” from the theory, the 
scientific model or the experiment entity to the problem entity. Basic scientific 
research may also resolve problems in experiments. For example, the research may be 
involved in the use of more sophisticated instruments to obtain better precision in 
experimental results. For applied research, the targeted research problem is not 
concerned with problems with the established theory or scientific model. Instead, 
applied scientific research uses the knowledge related to theories, scientific models or 
experiments to solve the targeted research problems. This corresponds to three 
directed lines that are labeled “apply” from the theory, the scientific model or the 
experiment entity to the solution entity. The difference between basic and applied 
scientific research is whether the scientific knowledge is a problem or is applied to 
formulate the solution. For some scientific research problems, they have both basic 
and applied scientific research elements, so these two types of scientific research 
overlap each other. 
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Scientific research is a kind of research, so we argue that: 
 
Definition 4: A scientific research problem is a research problem 
that is related to any elements of scientific studies (Figure 1, 5). 
 
By definition, a scientific research problem is about basic scientific research because 
the problem is related to the elements of scientific studies. A scientific research 
problem is more general than a hypothesis of the scientific method advocated by the 
Vienna Circle. For example, scientific instruments are designed and built for the 
purpose of making observations of rare phenomena. Building such scientific 
instruments may itself be a research problem because this may pose great technical 
challenges. The data collected from such instruments provide the first evidence of 
some unknown phenomena. There may be any theory at the time to justify the 
research problem as a hypothesis. However, since the research problem is related to 
gathering information to enable scientific studies, such activities should be classified 
as scientific research. Moreover, such scientific instruments contain technical 
knowledge that other scientists need to acquire and then replicate the results, as well 
as using such instruments to study other phenomena. Thus, such research on building 
scientific, precision instruments is also part of the scientific studies. 
4. Scientific progress 
Philosophy of science treated scientific studies as research. As a result, scientific 
progress and change are also seen in the light of progress or changes in research rather 
than scientific studies. The idea of paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1962) can be applied not 
just to science subjects but also research in other non-science subjects (Bod et al., 
2006). For instance, philosophy of science was once dominated by the common 
notion of scientific method. Later, the paradigm shifts toward the use of falsification 
to determine the surviving theory (Popper, 1959) as the scientific method. Some (e.g., 
Hansson, 2006) seeks evidence from scientific literature to determine if falsification is 
commonly used in science. Recently, science is thought to progress in a revolutionary 
manner by shifting paradigms (Kuhn, 1962). These studies are research works in 
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philosophy and not science, and yet they can be understood by Kuhn’s idea of 
paradigm shifts. As in many research works, these studies are kept focused by the 
research issues. On the other hand, scientific research (Figure 8) makes progress by 
focusing on research issues related to producing better experiments, models or 
theories. Experiments are better (Franklin, 1981) than older ones, for instance, if 
better instruments will provide more precise information with less noise in the data. 
Models are better than previous ones if they will make more accurate, reliable 
predictions (Franklin et al., 1989) for a wide variety of experiments. Theories are 
better than established ones if they will subsume or explain more models or 
observations. Therefore, we argue that philosophy of science should have a better 
balanced focus between the mechanism of and the content of scientific progress. 
 
Applying our process model to understand scientific progress, Figure 9 shows an 
illustrative example of multiple instances of the theory entity, the scientific model 
entity and the experiment entity. This example has three theories: A, B and C. 
Scientific model 1 is based on theory A and it models the physical situation 1 that 
experiment I is engaged in. Likewise, scientific model 2 is based on theory B and it 
models the physical situation 2 that experiment II is engaged in. Theory C appeared in 
this case to be more general than theory A and theory B because two scientific models 
(i.e., 3 and 4) are based on this theory; these two models describe two different 
physical situations that experiment I and II are engaged in. 
 
Figure 9 illustrates an example of how complex it is when comparing competing 
theories to account for different phenomena observed in experiments. Figure 9 depicts 
the theories as being distinct from each other. In practice, theories can overlap with 
each other because they are describing the same subject of investigation. For instance, 
theory A may share one principle with theory B but other principles are not shared. 
Likewise, the scientific models in Figure 9 are shown as distinct but competing 
models may be very similar with a large knowledge overlap and a small difference 
(e.g., some assumptions) between them. Such an instance diagram like Figure 9 helps 
us to appreciate better the possible complexities of research programmes (Lakatos, 
1977), scientific change (Kuhn, 1962) or scientific progress (Lauden, 1987). 
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Figure 9: An instance diagram of an example of multiple instances of the theory, 
scientific model and experiment entities. 
 
Models and experiments can be readily compared since they directly refer to similar 
abstract or physical situations. However, philosophers (e.g., Kuhn, 1962) have 
doubted whether theories can be compared because these theories are different 
understanding of or different sets of belief of nature. Difficulties to compare theories 
arise from the different terminologies of different theories, where different 
terminologies are thought to be describing different things or aspects that cannot be 
compared. While it is not straightforward to compare two different theories when they 
have different terminologies, we believe that this does not mean it is impossible to 
compare theories. Obviously, in order to compare two different theories, there must 
be some commonality between them. Based on the commonalities of different 
theories, scientists can come up with new methods of measurements or new quantities 
for comparison. In addition, since scientific theories and scientific models are usually 
formalized into some logical or mathematical descriptions, it may be possible to 
deduce consequences from these commonalities for comparisons. In some cases, one 
theory is found to be subsumed by another more general theory. For example, 
Newtonian mechanics is shown to be an approximation of the theory of general 
relativity. 
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A theory may not be supported by every experiment against another theory in terms of 
prediction accuracy, explanative power, simplicity, etc. If one theory is supported by 
every experiment but the other theories are not, then scientists would switch their 
allegiance (although this is not a logical necessity until proven because future 
experiments may indicate otherwise). On the other hand, a stalemate situation may 
occur where one theory is good at some experiments but not as good as another theory 
in other experiments. In this situation, scientists may ponder whether there is a line 
differentiating the applicability of different theories or wait until further evidence or 
experiments or better theories to come. For example, Newton's theory of motion is not 
abandoned completely. Newton's theory of motion is still the preferred one in solving 
mechanical engineering problems in our daily life. While scientific change or progress 
can be a very complex process as Feyerabend (1975) has pointed out, this does not 
necessarily mean that there are no underlying forces that drive the scientific change or 
progress. Scientists are faced with a complex decision to favor the use of a particular 
theory, or model or experiment. 
 
By using the guiding principles in the choice of theories, such as the principle of 
parsimony, it is possible to link the process model with some theory of science (Beth, 
1951) or with the choice of theory. The guiding principles that choose a theory can be 
used by individual scientists in favoring a particular theory. However, the pre-
requisite to such a choice also depends on the set of experiments that the theory excels 
compared with other competing theories. Scientists have the further option of not 
forming any allegiance to any specific theory on the basis of appealing to these 
guiding principles. Instead, scientists can design and carry out experiments in order to 
select the surviving theory in question. Instead of viewing these guiding principles as 
selecting a theory, they can be used as objectives in designing experiments to put 
theories into acid tests (i.e., experiments). For example, in string theory, an 
interpretation of the recent quest to unify all the known fundamental forces (i.e., 
electromagnetic force, gravitational force, weak nuclear force and strong nuclear force) 
is driven by the desire to satisfy the principle of parsimony. This principle is 
particularly noteworthy because it is related to the aim of developing theories, which 
generalizes the scientific models into a set of general/universal statements (Table 1) 
that are applicable within the regime of study. 
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5. Scientific Study Development 
We can also apply our process models to define and understand the different stages of 
the development of a scientific study. Keeping in mind the development of physics as 
an archetype of mature science, we propose that: 
 
Definition 5: A mature scientific study is a scientific study that 
contains at least one empirically established general scientific 
theory and more than one empirically established scientific model. 
 
This definition is consistent with definition 1, and it implies that a mature scientific 
study has some experiments which support the empirically established theories and/or 
models. Thus, a mature scientific study must have all the elements of a scientific 
study, and these interlocking elements should provide a coherent, comprehensive 
account of the subject of studies. A mature scientific study should have established 
models to describe at least some of the physical situations accurately, in order to 
demonstrate its predictive power or utility. These models should be subsumed by 
some established general theory. This is because there are so many models to account 
for so many different situations that a general theory is needed to identify the 
underlying concepts and their relationships. Without a general theory and possibly 
associated focused theories, these models appear as disconnected pieces of knowledge 
of the subject. 
 
A scientific model is established when it can make accurate predictions that other 
models cannot. Also, the established models should be domain-specific rather than 
random models used for hypothesis testing. This is because scientific models should 
make use of domain-specific knowledge to demonstrate their close connections to the 
subject of study, but such random models have little domain-specific knowledge that 
shows understanding of the subject. 
 
A scientific theory is said to be established when: 
(a) many different types of experiments support it; 
(b) it has constructed many models that made accurate predictions; and 
(c) it has wide spread acceptance amongst scientists. 
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Sometimes, (a) and (b) are combined together. For our example in Figure 4, results of 
the four types of experiments support Newtonian mechanics by showing that the 
models in Figure 3 can accurately predict the measurable quantities in equation (1) – 
(4). A recent example is the theory of general relativity, which is supported by various 
famous experiments (e.g., Eddington experiment, Gravity Probe B experiment, 
Pound-Rebka experiment and Hafele-Keating experiment) that are carried out after 
the publication of the theory of general relativity. 
 
We propose that another type of scientific study is:  
 
Definition 6: A developing scientific study is not a mature 
scientific study (as in Definition 5) and contains either at least an 
empirically established scientific model or an empirically 
established scientific theory. 
 
This definition also implies that a developing scientific study has some experiments 
which support the empirically established scientific theory or scientific model, but not 
both (in order to distinguish this type of scientific study from a mature one). For 
instance, I consider that the study of emerging web science (Berners-Lee et al., 2008) 
as a developing scientific study because (a) it has a well-known random surfer model 
of web page visits and (b) it has well-known empirical relationships (e.g., the 
frequency distribution of web page sizes follows Zipf law). I do not consider web 
science as a mature scientific study because it does not have a general scientific 
theory that covers wide ranging aspects of web science (e.g., web architecture, web 
growth and web page visits). 
 
Finally, we propose that: 
 
Definition 7: A formative scientific study is not a developing 
scientific study (as in Definition 6) but it is an empirical study with 
some established empirical research methodology. 
 
This definition specifies that a formative scientific study (e.g., (Oelkers, 1998)) has 
knowledge about experiments and the related physical situations in which these 
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experiments are carried out. The empirical research methodology on how to conduct 
the experiments should be widely accepted for reproducible results, or those that can 
be relied on. Such studies may have models and theories but they lack an established 
scientific model to provide accurate predictions, or they lack an established scientific 
theory that has wide-spread significance in the subject. Such formative scientific 
studies are usually limited in scope, so they rarely form a discipline and they may 
appear as non-mainstream publications in other related disciplines. We avoid the use 
of terms, like pseudoscience or proto-science, because of their loaded connotation.  
 
It should be noted that academic papers need not include all the elements of scientific 
studies, because the papers typically focus on a certain aspect of their scientific 
subject. A theoretical paper may synthesize a theory based on past works, or derive an 
important mathematical relationship from established laws. Einstein’s paper on  
theory of general relativity is an example. At the other end of the spectrum, an 
empirical paper may focus on the evaluation of a model. 
 
This charted course of a scientific study suggests that our process model of scientific 
study is applicable not just to science but also to other subjects. For example, law is a 
subject that has its legal theory, its principles of law, and its precedence of events, in 
which points of law are found. Also, law enforcement agencies carry out criminal 
investigations similar to scientific investigations. Unlike scientific studies, law does 
not have models that quantify the physical situations. In law, quantification is used to 
provide measures of the reliability of the supplied evidence for judgment. Therefore, 
we argue that a scientific study is not only defined by its way of scientific 
investigation, but also by how scientific knowledge is organized into interacting 
elements, i.e., theories, models, experiments and physical situations, and by its role. 
 
There are studies that are mainly concerned with theories and models. For example, 
optimization theory in mathematics aims to find optimal solutions to problems that 
arise from situations. Typically, the problem-solution pair is applicable to a class of 
situations. The objective function and the related constraints define the problem, 
which is the underlying reason for (or the theory behind the need of) the solutions that 
we are developing. The solution is a normative model, where the optimization theory 
prescribes an optimal, or near optimal or an efficient solution. These models do not 
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have to describe the physical situation accurately. In fact, they can distort and drive 
the physical situation so that good performance can be obtained. 
 
Computer science is an interesting discipline because it covers a wide-range of topics. 
When it is concerned about the construction of computers, it is an engineering subject. 
When it is concerned with the use of computers for scientific purposes (e.g., building 
and testing computational scientific models for weather forecasting), it becomes a 
science subject. Likewise, multidisciplinary subjects draw on theories, methods, 
models, etc. from a number of disciplines. For example, cognitive science is such a 
subject that draws expertise in psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence, 
neuroscience, etc. At present, cognitive science may be considered as a developing 
scientific subject since it has some successful scientific models or theories, but it does 
not have any general scientific theory that covers across disciplines for it to be 
considered as a mature scientific study. 
6. Related work 
Philosophy of science focuses on many different aspects of science, ranging from 
issues about truth, objectivity (Popper, 1972, Kuhn, 1977) and observation, to 
falsification (Popper, 1959), research programmes (Lakatos, 1977), scientific 
revolution (Kuhn, 1962), scientific progress (Lauden, 1987), the transitivity of choice 
of theory (Baumann, 2004) and theory change (Mattingly, 2005). Given this vast 
literature in philosophy of science, we have to be highly selective in reviewing only 
directly related and possibly complementary works. First, our process model cannot 
be a computational philosophy of science (Thagard, 1993) since our main interests are 
in describing scientific studies and not simulating them using artificial intelligence 
techniques to gain insights. 
 
Second, our process model of scientific study is different from the common notion of 
scientific methods, which is originated from the Vienna Circle. This common notion 
(Weston, 1987) of scientific methods undergoes a number of (sequential) stages as 
follows. First, scientists make some observations or some description of a 
phenomenon. Second, they formulate a hypothesis to explain the observation or 
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phenomenon. Third, they make predictions using the hypothesis. Fourth, they perform 
experiments to verify or refute the hypothesis. By contrast, our process model of 
scientific study is less restrictive than the notion of scientific method described 
previously. We argue that scientific research does not pre-occupy itself only on the 
hypothesis formation and testing. Instead, scientific research starts with scientific 
research questions (Definition 4) instead of hypotheses; and such questions may be 
more general than a hypothesis. For instances, our process model describes scientists 
building precision instruments for unobserved phenomena, or the research question is 
about a one-off historical event (e.g., meteorite-impact hypothesis for the extinction of 
dinosaurs). In applied science, scientists apply their scientific knowledge to solve 
technical problems that do not need to be related to any scientific theory or 
phenomena. 
 
Third, our process model is different from philosophical analysis, because each 
process model may develop into data models or transform into their instance models 
(or instance diagrams, e.g., Figure 2 and 4) which are absent from philosophical 
analysis. Specific constraints are imposed on the relationships between entities in the 
process model, although these constraints are not added for clarity of presentation in 
this paper. By contrast, philosophical analysis does not have such constraints. When 
process models are transformed into detailed data models, such models may have 
normal forms to comply with, whereas philosophical analysis does not deal with such 
details. In summary, the process model can be developed into a detailed, formal 
description of the entities and their relationships, whereas philosophical analysis 
provides a general description without a formal procedure for detailed model 
construction. 
 
Fourth, our process model is similar to but different from the abstract picture (Figure 
1 of (Giere, 2004)) of a view of scientific theories. In our process model, theories and 
experiments are explicitly modeled as entities. Our process model also considers 
scientific models as descriptions of the situation that is being studied. In fact, an 
experiment is a physical situation in which measurements are made. A model is an 
abstract (or conceptual) situation approximating the physical situation that is being 
studied. This abstract situation may represent a particular type of physical situation or 
a family of types of physical situations. A theory is a discourse of certain scientific 
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subject in our process model. This discourse highlights certain general statements, 
like assumptions and principles, which are used in constructing and generalizing 
scientific models. 
 
Gauch (2003) proposed a PEL model on reasoning for scientific inquiry. He has freed 
scientists from many philosophical impasses but PEL is focused on reasoning. This is 
because Gauch wants to claim that scientific studies produce objective, rational 
knowledge about reality. As a result, PEL has neglected experiments, models and 
theories that are priced dearly by scientists. Another concern about PEL is that it can 
be equally applied to legal reasoning for legal judgment in court and drawing 
conclusions in scientific studies. This raises a question as to whether PEL is a general 
valid reasoning process for making conclusions beyond science or a distinguishable 
feature of science. If PEL is about valid reasoning for daily life, then such valid 
reasoning ability should be treated as a skill not just for scientists but for any educated 
person. 
 
Gauch (2003) also made “four bold claims”, which are about the basic qualities of 
science. These qualities are rationality, truth, objectivity and realism. They belong to 
different elements or processes of our process model of scientific study. First, some 
theoretical statements, like laws or principles, are intended to be true in the sense that 
they are thought to exist in all or at some of their operating regime. Second, scientific 
models are realistic if they can predict quantities accurately and reliably for a variety 
of situations. Third, established scientific knowledge is consistent, so it is considered 
rational. Finally, the knowledge created via scientific study is objective in the sense 
that it is accessible to other scientists for validation or challenge. 
 
Apart from the aim of developing a model of scientific study, our process model is 
related to the engineering tasks of automating the management of scientific and 
research activities (such as paper review, research proposal vetting, etc). Our process 
model can be thought of as a more comprehensive, higher level model of the scientific 
knowledge infrastructure articulated by Hars (2001). Such an infrastructure provides 
details of scientific research based on studies in philosophy of science. Our process 
model adds the additional dimensions about scientific models and solutions to 
research problems to such a scientific knowledge structure. Our qualitative process 
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model complements current e-science activities (e.g., De Roure et al., 2003) that focus 
on the more quantitative aspect of scientific study. That is solving large-scale data-
intensive number crunching problems by grid computing. In addition, our process 
model forms a basis to develop data models (Silberschatz et al., 2005) that capture 
and organize knowledge for science and research. For example, some research work 
organized knowledge bases into some kind of ontology to assist scientific knowledge 
management (e.g., Kingston, 2002), and some focuses on the data integration and 
detailed scientific workflows (e.g., Ludäscher et al. (2006)) that are unconnected to 
issues in the philosophy of science. Some even include search facility (e.g., Shadbolt 
et al., 2004). This complements existing library studies that, for instance, investigate 
how best to create taxonomy of knowledge (e.g., Saracevic and Kantor, 1997). 
 
Our process model for research is at a higher level of abstraction than the more 
detailed computational model of human problem-solving (e.g., Simon, 1977; Bhaskar 
and Simon, 1977), and models of human problem-solving (e.g., Broadbent, 1977; 
Dörner, 1975). It is possible to integrate detailed models of problem solving with our 
process model of research. However, this is outside the scope of this paper because 
the purpose of developing our process model of research is to differentiate and 
integrate research and science. This is done by identifying the major elements of 
research and integrating them with our process model of scientific study. 
 
In the past, some philosophers (e.g., Liu, 1997; 1998) have discussed models, theories 
and their relationship, but it is rare to find a more comprehensive framework, as in 
this paper, that encompasses science, research and scientific progress. There are also 
works (Bod, 2006) that apply tools or techniques in computer science in philosophy of 
science. However, these works do not use process modeling nor data modeling 
methodologies (e.g., Silberschatz et al., 2005), and these works focus on addressing 
certain specific aspects of science. 
 
Our process model is very similar to the theory of idealization (Liu, 2004), even 
though our model is developed independently from it. While the theory of idealization 
regards models and theories as idealizations (Nowak, 1972; McMullin, 1985), we 
regard: 
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(a) laws in theories are expressing the underlying true relationship as found in 
physical situations; and 
(b) scientific models are approximating the physical situations (Niiniluoto, 
1987; Marquis, 1991). 
This is because theories and scientific models play different roles in the organization 
of scientific knowledge. Scientists want to discover the underlying relationship or law 
that is at play in their subject of study. What is believed to be imperfect is the 
controllability of the experiment that is responsible to bring the laws onto the surface 
from the messy data. Otherwise, if the inaccuracies of the law are not due to the 
controllability of the experiment, then some scientists will consider that it is 
worthwhile to investigate what is not accounted for by the concerned law. Some 
scientists may want to further the limit of predictability by inventing better controlled 
experiments in order to observe whether the existing law holds. If it does not hold, 
this is an important anomaly. If it holds, it provides a benchmark figure about the 
limit of predictability of the law for its application. Such confirmation study is carried 
out to test the famous equation, E = mc
2
 (Rainville et al., 2005). On the other hand, 
scientific models try to describe the physical situation as accurately as possible. When 
scientists found that there are inadequacies in their scientific models, they may try to 
improve them by incorporating more domain-specific technical knowledge to make 
their scientific models more realistic (Boon, 2006), or they may develop a new theory 
with a new set of related scientific models as an alternative to the existing ones. 
 
In our process models, scientific models are not “true” nor “approximately true” 
(Weston, 1987) in the sense that models are only accurate or inaccurate. They are the 
approximations (or idealizations) of physical situations. However, established 
statements in theories are not intended to be approximation nor idealization. Instead, 
they are thought to be true enabling logical deduction from these statements (Aliseda, 
2004). Because they are thought to be true according to the theory, scientists design 
controlled experiment to measure the precision of predictions that are derived from 
such statements in the theory. This differentiation of roles between theories and 
models set our process model apart from previous works (Niinluoto 1987; Weston, 
1987; Liu, 1999; 2004) that consider both theories and models to be approximately 
true. 
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Based on conclusion 1 and the process models developed in this paper, we answer our 
earlier questions in Section 1: 
(a) science is not solely concerned with scientific research; 
(b) scientific research has a scientific research question to answer (Definition 
4), and a hypothesis is a restricted form of scientific research question. 
Since scientific studies are more general than scientific research, they have 
study aims that are more general than answering hypotheses; 
(c) While the scientific method advocated by the Vienna Circle is useful to 
many scientists, it is not the only method to carry out scientific studies, 
because some scientific studies are not concerned with a hypothesis; 
(d) Paradigm shift by Kuhn is applicable not only to science but to other 
subjects. When it focuses on changes in the established or formative 
scientific knowledge, it is related to science. The scientific method of the 
Vienna circle is too general because the method is applicable to criminal 
investigations, where a hypothesis is a theory of how the crime is carried 
out, and the phenomena are the evidence found. Similarly, the PEL model 
by Gauch is applicable to law or philosophy in which knowledge is 
codified into logical statements for deductions and for testing valid 
reasoning. Therefore, we argue that future investigation about science 
should place an equal emphasis on its processes and its knowledge; 
(e) Our process model of scientific studies differentiates the roles of theories 
and scientific models. While statements in theories are intended to be true, 
scientific models are intended to be accurate. The different roles of 
theories and scientific models set our process model apart from other 
philosophical work on the concept that scientific knowledge is 
“approximately true” (Weston, 1987); 
(f) Some theories are incommensurable because they are about different 
subject of studies. Some theories about the same subject may not be 
immediately commensurable, because they use different terminologies. 
However, we argue that if these theories are applicable to the same 
physical situation, scientists will develop measures to quantify their 
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differences, similarities, generalities or their relationship with each other 
(even though this process may take some time); 
(g) Not all computational models are complex versions of scientific models, 
because they may be too difficult to be understood, or they do not relate to 
any scientific models; 
(h) Using our process model of scientific study, we have identified different 
stages of scientific study development (in Section 6). Obviously, these are 
not the only stages, because finer stages can be identified. 
 
Since we argue that future studies about science need to put a more balanced 
emphasis between its processes and its elements, we define science in concrete terms 
using our process model by first stating two related concepts called scientific 
understanding and scientific knowledge as follows: 
 
Definition 8: Scientific understanding of a subject is the ability to 
analyze or to apply the underlying concepts or their relationships 
that are found across different types of physical situations, in order 
to construct models which can accurately and reliably predict 
quantities that are measurable from (novel) physical situations. 
 
Implicitly, this definition assumes that understanding involves knowing the 
presuppositions, assumptions and conditions of applying the concepts and 
relationships (e.g., (Kosso, 2007)). Such presupposition, assumptions, etc. may be 
explicitly stated in the theory. The level of prediction accuracy in the previous 
definition depends on the currently achieved prediction accuracy, so this level 
advances as the scientific study advances. Together with our process model of 
scientific study, the previous definition helps us to define: 
 
Definition 9: Scientific knowledge is aimed at the scientific 
understanding (as in Definition 8) of a particular subject, and is 
related to or belongs to some elements of scientific studies (Figure 
1, 5). 
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This definition implies that scientific knowledge is related to theories, models, 
experiments or the related physical situations of study. Using these two concepts, 
science (Chalmers, 1999) is defined as follows: 
 
Definition 10: Science is a body of scientific knowledge (as in 
Definition 9) which is established by scientific research (Figure 8), 
and which is applied to solve technical problems. 
 
This definition involves both the scientific knowledge and scientific research to define 
science. As alluded earlier, scientific research differs from the scientific method in 
two respects: (1) scientific knowledge is related not just to theories but also models 
and experiments, and (2) scientific research problems are more general than 
hypotheses because these problems can be about scientific models or experiments, but 
these problems are more focused on the scientific knowledge than hypotheses that are 
applicable to other subjects (e.g., criminal investigation). This definition of science 
includes both the basic science and applied science. In this definition, technical 
problems are not trivial to solve, and they are not directly related to problems of the 
established scientific knowledge (see Figure 8). We argue that these definitions 
together with our process models form a basis for discussing philosophical issues 
about science in a context that is better balanced between scientific knowledge and 
scientific processes, where this basis is sufficiently distinct from studies of other 
disciplines. 
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